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NOTES

... And

Justice For All: Normative

Descriptive Frameworks for the
Implementation of Tribunals to Try

Human Rights Violators
ABSTRACT

With the formation of the Bosnian and Rwandan War
Crimes Tribunals, the internationalcommunity has created a
mechanism for the enforcement of human rights law for the
first time since the Nuremburg and Tokyo War Trials. The
efficacy of these tribunals, however, is in doubt. This Note
proposes that only afew human rights are truly universal in
nature and can be guaranteed by the international
community.
Furthermore, the political realities of the
international system precludes the use of international
tribunals against the more powerful nations of the
international community.
The Note concludes that by
focusing on the human rights that can be protected, and
protecting them, a baseline framework for the effective
enforcement of human rights can be establishedfrom which
no nations may deviate.
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The last few decades have seen a more extended and
internationalized conscience in respect to human rights, such that
we are confronted with and increasingly forced toward a deeper
understanding of what the struggle for human rights means. I

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1993, the United Nations Security Council established an
Intemational Criminal Tribunal in the Hague to prosecute war
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. 2 A year later, a

1.
Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Afterword, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN
RIGH-E 105 (Paul Williams ed.. 1981).
2.
Roger Cohen. When the Price of Peace is Injustice. N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 12,
1995, at A2. The tribunal was created in response to the atrocities committed In
Bosnia, as well as war crimes that occurred during the earlier Serb-Croat war.
The former Yugoslavia was composed of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovlna. The Bosnian conflict
was a war between the three major groups comprising the Republic, the Bosnian
Serbs (aligned with Serbia), the Bosnian Muslims. who controlled the BosniaHerezegovina government, and the Bosnian Croats (supported by Croatia). Fred L.
Morrison, The Constitutionof Bosnta-HerzegovLn, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 145, 146
(1996).
Both tribunals were created by the U.N. Security Council as Chapter VII
entities. The states involved were required to cooperate with the tribunals or face
sanctions imposed by the Security Council. David J. Scheffer, International
JudicialIntervention, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1996, at 40.
The Bosnian Tribunal's jurisdiction is premised on violations of international
humanitarian law. Bernard D. Meltzer, "War Crimes":The Nuremburg Trial and the
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 895, 907 (1996).
Specifically, the tribunal is investigating the following violations of the Geneva
Convention of 1949: 1) "grave breaches" of the Convention (art. 2): violations of
the laws or customs of war (art 3.); genocide (art. 4); and crimes against humanity
(art. 5). I.
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similar war crime tribunal for Rwanda was created. 3 By the time
Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and Alija Izetbegovic, the
Presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia respectively, met in
Dayton, Ohio, in November, 1995, the Hague Tribunal had
indicted forty-five Serbs and seven Croats. 4 The indictments
included Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, 5 and his
military commander, General Ratko Mladic. 6 The magnitude of
the indictments increased after the three leaders accepted a draft
Constitution for Bosnia that would bar any person under
indictment, or convicted by, the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia from becoming President or a member of the
Bosnian Parliament. 7 Upon the signing of the Constitution,
academics and world leaders immediately began to question

whether the Bosnian Serbs would accept the Dayton peace

proposal. 8
The importance of the International Criminal Tribunal in the
Hague and the subsequent International Criminal Tribunal for

Rwanda lay in the fact that, for the first time, the international

community was conducting criminal investigations into human
rights abuses by participants who were still involved in an
ongoing conflict that the international community was attempting

3.
Betsy Pisik, Rwandan Official Faces Genocide Charges in NuremburgStyle Tral, WASH. TIMES. Nov. 14, 1996, at A14. A six-judge panel was established
in Arusha, Tanzania, to try human rights violators that murdered more than an
estimated 500,000 Rvandan Tutsi and moderate Hutus in 1994. Elizabeth
Neuffer, Mismanagement and Red Tape Impede Tribunal. BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11,
1996, atAl.
4.
Chris Hedges. War Crimes Tribunal Indicts 6 Bosnian Croats,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1995. at A3.
5
Karadzic was forced to relinquish official power as President of the
Bosnian Serb state and head of the Serb Democratic Party in July, 1996.
However, though indicted, Karadzic was not turned over to the tribunal. An
Insufficient Solution in Bosnia: Resignation Still Leaves Karadzic too Close to Power,
BUFFALO NEWS, July 20. 1996. at C2.
6.
U.S.-Drafted Bosnia Law Ousts Serb Leader, USA TODAY. Nov. 7, 1995,
at 4A. Survivors of the mass killings in the Bosnian city of Srebrenica claimed
that General Mladic personally witnessed mass executions. Anthony Lewis, Thith
and Its Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1995, at A13. As many as 6,000 unarmed
civilians may have been killed in Srebrenica, the worst war crime in Europe since
World War II. Id.
7.
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA CONST.. art. IX, para. 1, 35 I.L.M. 75, 125 (1996).
The Constitution as a whole catalogs many human rights to be protected. Id.
art. II, para. 3. The Constitution also states, "[The rights and freedoms set forth
In the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These
shall have priority over all other law." Id. art. II, para. 2.
8.
See, e.g., Bill Clinton, Why Bosnia Matters to America, NEsWWK., Nov.
13, 1995, at 55; Meltzer, supra note 2, at 909; Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs.
Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L LAW 500, 502-04 (1994).
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to end. 9 Even as the negotiations in Dayton unfolded, there was
increasing pressure on the Hague Tribunal to indict Milosevic
himself, the "undisputed authority in Belgrade at the time of the
Vukovar siege."10 However, it was also widely assumed and
understood that if peace were to be made it could only be made
"with someone who [could] deliver. That man [was] Milosevic.""l
The dilemma that confronted negotiators in Dayton and the
Tribunal in the Hague was obvious: Would human lights
abusers be given amnesty to bring peace to the Balkans? As
President Clinton noted, "We have an urgent stake in stopping
12
the slaughter [and] preventing the war from spreading."
However, unlike Nuremburg, the leaders who condoned the
atrocities remained in power and had the ability to prolong the
conflict.
Central to the Balkan and Rwandan problems, as well as
similar future crises involving human rights abuses, is the
question of when the international community should demand

justice

for human rights violations, no

matter what the

consequences. If the most important human right Is the right to
live, 13 then the underlying dilemma is clearly defined. Will a
greater number of lives be saved by trying war criminals or by

9.
Cohen, supra note 2. The only other previous tribunals were at
Nuremburg and Tokyo following World War II. Meltzer. supra note 2, at 907.
Those tribunals took place after the war when the Allied powers controlled
Germany and Japan.
10.
Cohen, supra note 2. Three Serbian officers of the regular Army of
Serbia were indicted in early November. 1995. specifically for their Involvement In
the massacres that took place in Vukovar. Lewis, supranote 6.
11.
Cohen, supranote 2.
12.
Clinton, supra note 8, at 55. A leading advocate of amnesty for peace
in the Balkans. as well as other parts of the world, has been former President
Jimmy Carter. Neil A. Lewis, The Nation: Nuremburg Isn't Repeating Itself, N. Y.
TIMES. Nov. 19, 1995, at E5. Cf.Richard Goldstone, Exposing Human R(ghts
Abuses-A Help or Hindrance to Reconciliation?.22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 607. 620
(1995).
13.
Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess.. at 72. U.N. Doc. A/810, art. Ill(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
The first right to be declared in the Universal Declaration Is the "right to life." Id.
See also, InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights. G.A. Res. 2200. U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52. U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
6 I.L.M. 368, art. 6 (1967) [hereinafter Civil Law and Political Covenant): European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
2, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European
Convention]; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Ninth
International Conference of American States, May 8, 1948, O.A.S. Res. 30, O.A.S.
Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/1.4 Rev., art. 1 (1965) [hereinafter American Declaration];
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, Organization of
African Unity, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982)
[hereinafter African Charter]. As a practical matter, one must be alive to enjoy the
rights enshrined in human rights treaties and conventions.
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granting amnesty? If the international community emphasizes
the enforcement of human rights by trying violators, wars may be
prolonged and despotic regimes may cling to power until the
bitter end. If the international community focuses on resolving
conflicts, an implicit signal may be sent to the Mladic or Pol Pot of
the future that he can get away with genocide.
Bosnia and Rwanda underscore the difficulties of human
rights enforcement, especially in light of the fundamental
principle governing human rights to save the maximum number
of lives possible. This Note attempts to define normative 14 and
descriptive 15 frameworks for the application of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 16 and other human rights
accords, 1 7 based on principles of utility and realpolitik to help
guide the policymaker and the international jurist in resolving
this question. 18
Section II explains the general arguments for and against the
involvement of the international community in the enforcement of
human rights. A basic understanding of these contentions is
necessary to develop normative and descriptive theories of
intervention. Section III addresses the problem of what human
rights should be protected.
As human rights theory has
developed in the post-World War II era, academics and

14.
Normative is defined as "of or pertaining to a norm regarded as correct,
as in behavior." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 600 (2d ed. 1980). A normative
framework attempts to describe an ideal system.
15.
Descriptive is defined as "the act or method of describing." Id. at 238.
A descriptive framework attempts to explain the system as it exists.
16.
Universal Declaration.supra note 13.
17.
See, e.g., InternationalCovenanton Economic, Social and CulturalRights,
G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st. Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967). 999 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) [hereinafter Economic and Social
Covenant]; Civil Law and Political Covenant, supra note 13; European Convention.
supra note 13; European Social Charter. Oct. 18, 1961. 529 U.N.T.S. 89

[hereinafter Social Charter]; American Declaration, supra note 13; American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22. 1969, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev.1, Corr.2 (Jan. 7, 1970), 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter
American Convention]; African Charter.
18.
In 1998, a U.N. conference on the creation of a permanent world
criminal court is scheduled. Lauren Comiteau, U.N. Plans to Create World Criminal
Court, CHRISrIAN Sci. MONrrOR, Dec. 31, 1996. at 7.

Some countries like China, India, and Singapore have criticized the idea. They
claim that such a tribunal, to be effective, would violate the principle of
sovereignty. Other countries like Canada, Germany, Sweden, and Italy have
rejected proposals to grant the court broad powers. The United States has
advocated a permanent court, but wants to limit its jurisdiction to violations of
International humanitarian law. John M. Goshko, U.N. Moving Toward Creationof
CriminalCourt, But Advocates Severe Limits, Backed by U.S., Will Be Imposed on Its
Independence, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1996, at A27. This Note assumes that even if
a permanent court is established, which is highly unlikely, its jurisdiction would
be limited.
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practitioners have immersed themselves in exhaustive arguments
over the universality of human rights. 19 A generally accepted

notion in human rights theory, developed by Karel Vasek, Is that

there are "three generations" 20 of human rights. This Note will
argue that the international community can only protect and
enforce the most universal of the first-generation rights,2 1 those
22
generally considered to bejus cogens norms.

19. The cultural patterns, ideological underpinnings and developmental
goals of non-Western and socialist states are markedly at variance with the
prescriptions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Efforts to
improve the Declaration as it currently stands not only reflect a moral
chauvinism and ethnocentric bias but are also bound to fail.
Adamantia Pollis & Peter L. Schwab. Human Rights: A Western Construct with
Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES I,
37 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979). Compare:
[C]ontemporary defenses of universalism range from natural rights
arguments to positivism to utilitarianism to social contract theories.
Regardless of which form the arguments ultimately take, assertions of the
universal nature of such claims tend to rest upon an epistemological
assumption about the universality of human reason rather than a
metaphysical claim about their correspondence with a reality independent
of human understanding. Under such immanent universalist theories.
truth is a product of the right functioning of human reasoning. This claim
about human knowing, In turn, has the consequence of privileging the
thinker, the philosopher, the scientist, or the lawyer in the debate over the
The truth claims that emerge are
meaning of human experience.
normative and are understood as substantially independent of history,
individual choices, and human experience. Disagreements over human
rights are errors in reason, logical mistakes which can be resolved through
better thinking.
Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 94-95 (1996).
20.
Karel Vasak, A 30-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of
Law to the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, UNESCO COURIER, Nov. 1977, at
29.
"Inspired by the three normative themes of the French Revolution, they are:
the first generation of civil and political rights (libert); the second generation of
economic, social and cultural rights (dgalite; and the third generation of newly
called solidarity rights (fratemite)." Bums H. Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS INTHE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 14 (Richard Pierre Claude &
Burns H. Weston eds., 1992).
21.
Vasak defines first-generation rights as "civil and political rights."
Vasak, supranote 20, at 29. Cf. HOwARD TOLLEY, THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 21-22 (1987).
Focusing enforcement on the most universal of human rights does not imply
that other human rights abuses, such as Individual torture, deserve approbation.
Rather, the latter are not the types of abuses that the international community
can pragmatically address by international tribunals at this stage in the
development of international law. See infra Part III.B.
22.
Ajus cogens norm is an international norm from "which no derogation
is permissible." OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL Law 7 (R.Y. Jennings & A. Watts eds.,

19971

EFFECTIVEENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Synthesizing the background information presented in
Sections II and III, Section IV will introduce a descriptive theory
of human rights enforcement based on normative values: the
framework of universal principles that "ought" to be protected by
the international community through tribunals refined by the
realities of the modem international system of nation states.
Section IV initially focuses on an ideal world, but the normative
values will be refined by principles of utility and realpolitik to also
project a descriptive theory of human rights enforcement. This
descriptive theory analyzes the ability of the international
community to currently defend normative values.
Such an analysis is not intended to be an end, but is offered as a
point of departure towards an ideal world where every violation of
a human right is punished. This transformation will not occur
overnight, but will be a gradual process. It is essential for the
clarity and efficiency of international human rights law that all
nations understand what constitutes the present baseline. As
the development of international law and human rights
progresses, the excuses inherent in the present system should
and will be stripped away until all human rights violations are

prosecuted.
II. THE ARGUMENTS REGARDING WHETHER THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT TRY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
A. Why the InternationalCommunity Should Try HumanRights
Abuses
The main reason for criminally punishing human rights
violators is that by doing so the international community wil
deter future repression. 23 Deterrence is necessary not only to
prevent the actions of future violators, but is essential to the
functioning of societies based on law. 24 It may be necessary for
countries rebuilding themselves after civil war, or after suffering
repression or brutality,2 5 to criminally punish human rights
9th ed. 1992) reprinted in Louis HENKIN, Er AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw CASES AND

MATERIALS 91 (3d ed. 1993).
23.
Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations ofa PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991).
24. "Citing Hannah Arendt's view that 'the first step on the road to total
domination is to kill the juridical person in man,' David Remnick, the Moscow
correspondent for The Washington Post, has observed. "'Likewise, the first

essential step toward liberty is the revival of the legal impulse in man'." Id. (citing
L. WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE 242 (1990) (quoting Remnick).

356

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONA

LAW

[VoL 30:349

abusers as a method of reevaluating their own commitment to the
principles of democracy or aiding in their transition to
26
democracy.
If states violate the obligation that they have taken upon
themselves as purveyors of the law, the role of the law in society
is undermined. 2 7 International law, as well as any code of
justice, depends on a state maintaining its domestic
responsibilities to its citizens. 2 8 As Diane Orentlicher notes:
If law is unavailable to punish widespread brutality of the recent
past, what lesson can be offered for the future? A complete failure
of enforcement vitiates the authority of law itself, sapping its power
to deter proscribed conduct. This may be tolerable when the lav or
the crime is of marginal consequence, but there can be no scope for
eviscerating wholesale laws that forbid violence and that have been
violated on a massive scale. Societies recently scourged by
lawlessness need look no farther than their own past to discover
the costs of impunity. Their history provides sobering cause to
29
believe, with William Pitt. that tyranny begins where law ends.

25.

The potential for human rights abuses

increases with domestic

instability. Most international conventions and treaties permit states to take the
least restrictive measures to repress a "public emergency." See. e.g.. European
Convention. supra note 13, art. 15: Civil Law and Political Covenant, supra note
13, art. 4. See also Lawless. 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 438 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.. H.R. (ser. A) 4 (1978).
Even if torture could be shown to be efficient in some cases, it could
simply never be permissible . . . Once justified and allowed for the
narrower purpose of combating political violence, torture will almost
inevitably be used for a wider range of purposes against an Increasing
proportion of the population . . . The law does not and must not
accommodate torture.
AMNESY INTERNATIONAL. inTomRuRE INTHE EIGHTIES 4-8 (1984).
26.
Orentlicher. supranote 23, at 2543.
27.
Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as "Rights", 1 CARDOZO L.
REV. 425 (1979).
Richard Goldstone has articulated four choices for new democratic

governments:
1. To grant immunity or Indemnity for past criminal acts;
2. To allow a regular justice system to operate and for ordinary courts to
try and sentence any persons proven guilty of criminal conduct prior or
subsequent to the transition to democracy;
3. To establish a truth and reconciliation commission or its equivalent in
order to enable confessions of guilt for past human rights abuses to be
traded for indemnities; and
4. A modified form of truth commission where the most serious offenders
remain subject to loss of office or even prosecution.
Goldstone, supranote 12, at 609.
28.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 25, at 4-7.
29.
Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2542.
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Advocates of intervention contend that prosecuting violators is an
essential and effective tool for assisting a nation in becoming a
democracy. 30 If violators are not tried, it may "undermine the
legitimacy of a new government and breed cynicism toward
civilian institutions" 3 1 because "law 'is located in our myths and
32
stories as a powerful attribute of legitimate authority.'"
Because democracies depend on the rule of law, countries
beginning to experiment with democracy may find it imperative to
pursue human rights violators. 33 Without the knowledge that
laws will actually be enforced, no matter who, the transgressor is,

people in a civilized nation will not be able to fully exercise the
economic, civil, and social rights guaranteed to them by the wide
assortment

states.3 4

of conventions

and treaties that apply

to most

If the violators are members of a military regime and

there is no enforcement of human rights,3 5 the military leaders in
charge have effectively decreed that the military can disregard
any rule, thereby establishing a military state. 36 'The military's

capacity to exercise a veto power over government policies ...
vitiat[es] the sovereignty of the national polity."3 7 However, if the
political and military leaders who violate human rights are
30.
Jaime Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma of
TransitionalDemocratic Governments. in JUSiCE AND SOCIETY PROGRAM OF THE ASPEN
INsTrrUTE. STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 89 (1989).
31.
Orentlicher. supranote 23, at 2543.
32.
Id. (quoting Robert Cover. The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction.
14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179. 180 n.7 (1985).
33.
Id For example. in Argentina, Raul Alfonsin campaigned on a platform
of investigating human rights abuses. Carlos S. Nino. The Duty to Punish Past
Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context The Case of Argentina. 100 YALE. L.J.
2619, 2622 (1991). After assuming office. Alfonsin created a Comisi6n Nacional
Parala Desaparici6nde Personasto investigate human rights abuses. Id. at 2623.
Carlos Nino concludes that "Igliven the circumstances, Alfonsin's investigation
and prosecution of past human rights abuses held up miraculously well." Id. at
2637.
34.
Orentlicher. supra note 23, at 2543.
However, in a number of
countries including the Philippines and Chile, truth commissions failed or were
limited in their achievements. Goldstone, supra note 12, at 612-13 (contrasting
successful investigations in Chile with investigations stymied in other countries).
Tkvo such documents applicable to virtually all states are the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the InternationalComment on Civil and PoliticalRights, supra
note 13.
35.
Most human rights violations occur at the hands of the police or by a
military regime. See Alejandrom Garro & Henry Dahl, Legal Accountability for
Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step Forwardand Two Steps Backward,
8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 283 (1987).
36.
Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2543-44. A prime example of this
problem is Chile. where General Agosto Pinochet stepped down in 1990 and
permitted a transition to democracy, but still maintains considerable power.
Sebastian Rotella, Wealthy Chile Clings to Old Values, CHI. SUN-TIMES. Jan. 5,
1997, at 63.
37.
Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2543-44.

358

VANDERBILT JOURVAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

/VoL 30:349

prosecuted, the validity and strength of democratic principles Is
38
affirmed.
In summary, the primary reasons for intervening and trying
the violations of a previous regime are premised on the belief that
it is necessary to review human rights violations, and further, to
punish the leaders that committed the evil acts.
Without
retribution and justice, a society cannot make the difficult
transition to democracy.3 9 Only by punishing lawbreakers can
the populace understand the concept of the "rule of law," and
more importantly, believe in the values implicit within the
framework that is the modem liberal state. 40 , By punishing
human rights violators, the international community also sends a

strong signal of deterrence to future despots. 41 Only by clear and
convincing action will the international community communicate
42
the message that violations and violators will not be tolerated.
B. Why the InternationalCommunity Should Not Try Human Rights
Abuses
The primary arguments against a general rule requiring
prosecutions are generally twofold. First, politically charged trials
may undermine a nation's transition to democracy. 43 Second, the
international community's continued reliance on the principle of
state sovereignty 44 precludes widespread implementation of
38.
Id. See, e.g., Nino, supra note 33. Examples also include the Danish
and Australian prosecution of Nazi collaborators, and the South African truth
cormnission. Goldstone, supranote 12, at 609-10, 613-14.
39.
Orentlicher. supra note 23. at 2543. Goldstone emphasizes the need
for acknowledging crimes committed.
Goldstone, supra note 12, at 615.
Goldstone contends that it is only with acknowledgment that the process of
reconciliation can begin. Id.
40.
Orentlicher, supranote 23, at 2543.
41.
Id. See also D'Amato, supra note 8, at 504.
42.
D'Amato, supra note 8, at 504. See also Symposium. Transitions to
Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoLy 965, 1044 (remarks of
Nigil Rodley), 1054 (remarks of Diana Orentlicheeak) (1990) [hereinafter

Transitons to Democracy).
43.
Orentlicher. supra note 23, at 2544. Latin American countries In
particular have found trials to be problematic. Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile all
enacted amnesty laws because of the fear of military reprisal. Goldstone, supra
note 12, at 611-13.
44. The predominant ordering logic since the Peace of Westphalia has
been associated with the 'will' of the territorial sovereign state. The
government of a state has been its exclusive agent with respect to
formulating its will in external relations. The juridical framework of
relations worked out in the West has been gradually generalized to apply
throughout the globe.
Richard A. Falk, TheoreticalFoundationsof Human Rights, in HUMAN RIos: ISSUEs
AcION 32 (Richard Pierre Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1992).
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human rights tribunals, generally under the precept of preserving
law and order.45 Countries emerging from civil war are often
fragmented and on the verge of disintegration. 4 6 Any attempt to
prosecute the violations of a previous regime would further
fracture the remaining stability of the nation, sending it back into
conflict or allowing the rise of a new despot. 4 7 Given the
possibility of such turmoil, the best policy may be to emphasize
peace at all costs, and granting amnesty to violators of a previous
regime under a policy of reconciliation. 48 Some countries, like
Chile and South Africa, have permitted the departing regime or
military government to retain considerable power after their
official departure from power. Attempts at prosecuting human
rights violators may undermine the new government's authority4 9
or provoke unrest.5 0 In a number of countries, "security forces
have retained modest power relative to [an] elected government,
[and] prosecution[s] may induce the military to 'close ranks'."5 t
In situations like these, "[Prosecutions could reinforce the
military's propensity to challenge democratic institutions."5 2

45.

LEO KUPER, The Sovereign Territorial State: The Right to Genocide, in

GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE INTHE TWENTETH CENTuRY 161 (1981).
46.
Obvious examples include Chile, in the post-Pinochet era. and
Cambodia after the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge. Probably the most powerful

example of the difficulty in assessing culpability is that of the German Democratic
Republic (the former East Germany). After the reunification with the Federal
Republic of Germany and the opening of the Stasi fies, it was estimated that
250,000 people had served the brutal secret police at some point in time. Roberto
Fabriclo, Germany and the Ghosts of StasL J. COM.. Aug. 28, 1995, at AlO. Stasi
informers included Henry Schramm, leader of the West German Green Party, and
Dieter Stein, the Interior Ministry official given responsibility for dismantling the
secret police. Ray Moseley, Legacy of Secret Police Haunts East Germany, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 28, 1990. at C18.
47.
Josd Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by
Former Governments: PrinciplesApplicable and Political Constraints, in JUSICE AND
SOCIETY PROGRAM OF THE ASPEN INsrrTITU.

STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON

37-38 (1989).
48.
Id. See also D'-ansitionsto Democracy, supranote 42, at 1043 (remarks
of the Honorable Didier Opertti); Nino, supranote 33, at 2620.
49.
See Orentlicher, supranote 23. at 2544-46.
50.
Dissatisfaction with prosecutions of military officers for past human
rights violations was a prominent factor in three rebellions against the
government of Argentine President Raul Alfonsin. See Shirley Christian, Argentine
Departs,Democracy Hardly Bankrupt,N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1989, § 1, at 2.
51.
Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2545. "In a number of the Central
American countries and the smaller and less institutionalized South American
countries, there is a dual power structure-civilian and military, co-existing
uneasily, side-by-side-with the relative balance of power between them being
renegotiated on virtually a daily basis." Transitions to Democracy. supra note 42,

at 1024 (remarks of Professor Howard J. Wiarda).
52.
Orentlicher, supra,note 23, at 2545; Transitions to Democracy, supra
note 42, at 1024. Three political assassinations ended the public debate initiated
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Given the relative instability of some of these nations, some
commentators argue that the transition to democracy is best
served by not prosecuting human rights violators. 5 3 These
arguments are based largely on the claim that "transitional
societies may not yet possess the attributes of a viable
democracy."5 4 New governments may lack the legitimacy or the
power to challenge former despots, and the international
community should not press these nations to act as full-fledged
democracies when the process has only begun. 55 If a conflict is
still in progress, its cessation at all costs should be the primary
goal of the international community and the principals within the
56
nation.
This argument advocates for the lesser evil.
A fragile
government must be wary of instituting prosecutions because the
violators may attempt to overthrow the government or continue
conflicts. These actions may cause more harm than the ultimate
good they achieve of prosecuting a few individuals. 57
Another argument often asserted is that the principle of state
sovereignty precludes any widespread implementation of
international human rights tribunals. 58 This concept is premised
on the argument that any alleged abuses were not a violation of
the nation's duties under international conventions 5 9 or within
the public emergency exceptions of such conventions. 60 As Leo
Kuper states:
The major and important contribution of the United Nations has
been in the provision of humanitarian relief for the survivors of the
genocidal conflicts... [The] United Nations is not a humanitarian,

by the Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. Goldstone,
supra note 12, at 612.
53.
Alfred Stepan, Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and
ComparativeConsiderations,in TRANSrIONS FROM AurHoRrrARIAN RULE: CoMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 64-68 (G. O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986).
54.
Orentlicher, supranote 23, at 2545.
55.
See Transitions to Democracy, supra note 42, at 1026 (remarks of
Professor Howard J. Wiarda).
56.
Orentlicher, supranote 23, at 2545.
57.
Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2545. Cf. Transitions to Democracy,
supra note 42, at 1056 (remarks of Diana Orentlicher) ("[A)failure to punish any
of the past violations would undermine the deterrence objectives underlying the
general duty to punish. If the new government established a wholesale impunity
for past violations of fundamental rights committed on a vast scale, Its action
would . . . have the effect of tolerating or condoning the past violations and
thereby encouraging similar ones.").
58.
KUPER, supranote 45, at 161.
59.
See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 13, art. 15 ("In time of war
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting
Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this
Convention. . . ").

60.

KUPER, supranote 45, at 161.
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but a political, organization, and its humanitarian goals are at the
play of political forces, pressure groups, and blocs, in an arena
where delegates pursue the divisive interests of the states they
represent. Added to this, its ideological commitment to the
protection of the sovereignty of the state, with the corollary of
nonintervention in its domestic affairs, stands in the way of
effective action ....

And above all, it is the rulers of the states of

the world who gather together at the United Nations, and it is,
though not exclusively, the rulers who engage in [human rights
61
abuses].

The emphasis on state sovereignty is not just a Western concept,

but one that all nations accentuate, including Communist and
62

Third World states.

An important corollary to sovereignty is the right to selfdetermination. 63 "The right to self-determination, to freedom
from alien subjugation and exploitation, was an inspiring,
crusading call in the movement for decolonization."6 4 Many lessdeveloped countries now use this right to justify any actions they
take within their border.6 5 Furthermore, most human rights
treaties permit some derogation from the text in the state of a
public emergency.66 Thus, any human rights violations that

61.
Id. at 175.
62.
Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 39. 43 (Dec.
15) (Individual opinion of Judge Alvarez) ("Some jurists have proposed to abolish
the notion of the sovereignty of States, considering it obsolete. That is an error.
This notion has its foundation in national sentiment and in the psychology of the
peoples, in fact it is very deeply rooted.").
63.
See. e.g., United Nations Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, U.N. G.A.O.R., 25th Sess., Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/Res.
2625 (XXV) (1970).
Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present
principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and
independence. In their actions against, and resistance to. such forcible
action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such
peoples are entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter.
Id.
64.

KUPER, supranote 45, at 182.

65.
Id. at 182-83.
66.
See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 13, art. 15 (states are
permitted to take measures "required by the exigencies of the situation"):
American Convention, supra note 17, art. 27 ("In time of war, public danger, or
other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party, it
may take measures derogating from its obligations under the present Convention
to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation...").
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transpire are touted as actions by the state to maintain law and
order.

67

In conclusion, critics of international intervention to try
human rights violators first argue that societies beginning the
process of becoming a democracy may not be stable enough to
withstand the harsh effects of a complete catharsis. 68 Second,
they argue that principles of state sovereignty and selfdetermination do not permit the international community to

systematically address human rights abuses at the international
level. 69 They claim that any attempt by the world community to
universally punish human rights violators, through the United
Nations or a World Court, would be rebuffed if it appeared that

the elemental concepts of sovereignty or self-determination were
being undermined.

III. WHICH HUMAN RIGHTS ARE UNIVERSAL ENOUGH TO DESERVE
PROTECTION

A. The UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights70
The universal emphasis on delineating human rights 7 1 is
primarily a modem phenomenon 72 in response to the worldwide

67.
KUPER, supra note 45, at 161. See also Lawless, supranote 25; Ireland
v. United Kingdom. supra note 25. In Ireland v. United Kingdo. the European
Court of Human Rights found that hooding, wall-standing, subjection to noise.
and deprivation of food and drink was not torture. Id. The Court did find that
these actions constituted Inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article
3 of the European Convention. Id.
In Lawless the European court stated that two elements needed to be present
for an emergency: First, the emergency must be nation-wide In its effects, so that
however severe the local impact of an emergency may be, It will not, In the
absence of that condition, be a 'public emergency' in the sense of
paragraph (1) [of Article 151. Secondly. the threat must be to organized
life. which suggests that the emergency does not have to be one In which
'the life of the nation' as such Is threatened with extinction, but one in
which there is such a breakdown of order of communications that
organized life cannot, for the time being, be maintained.
Lawless, supra note 25.
68.
Orentlicher, supranote 23, at 2544.
69.
KUPER. supra note 45, at 161.
70.
UniversalDeclaration,supranote 13.
71.
Human rights have five main attributes:
First, regardless of their ultimate origin or justification, human rights are
understood to represent individual and group demands for the shaping
and sharing of power, wealth, enlightenment, and other cherished values
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repulsion of the Nazi atrocities brought to light at the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg. 73 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was unanimously adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, 74
as the first international vessel to combine the primary political
and civil rights of various states and legal systems. 75 Though not
a treaty or a convention, the Universal Declaration "has acquired
76
a status juridically more important than originally intended."
The civil and political rights expounded upon in the
Universal Declaration were subsequently incorporated into the
in community process, most fundamentally the value of respect and its
constituent elements of reciprocal tolerance and mutual forbearance in the
pursuit of all other values.
Second, reflecting varying environmental circumstances, differing
worldviews, and inescapable interdependencies within and between value
processes, human rights refer to a wide continuum of value claims ranging
from the most justiciable to the most aspirational....
Third, if a right is determined to be a human right it is
quintessentially general or universal in character, in some sense equally
possessed by all human beings everywhere, including in certain instances
even the unborn... human rights extend, in theory, to every person on
Earth without discriminations irrelevant to merit.
Fourth, most assertions of human rights . . . are qualified by the
limitation that the rights of any particular individual or group in any
particular instance are restricted as much as is necessary to secure the
comparable rights of others and the aggregate common interest... human
rights are sometimes designated prima facie rights, and it makes little or
no sense to think or talk of them in absolutist terms.
Fifth . . . human rights are commonly assumed to refer in some

vague sense, to "fundamental" as distinct from "nonessential" claims or
"goods"

. .

. the tendency. in short, is to de-emphasize or rule out "mere

wants."
Weston, supra note 20, at 17-18.
72.
Historically, human rights were perceived as the rights of nationals of
states-an extension of the right of the state itself. The modem conception of
individual rights came in the wake of World War II.
Louis Henkin, The
Internationalizationof Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

596, 596-97 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 3rd ed. 1993).
73.
Weston, supra note 20, at 22. In addition to being charged with war
crimes, the Nazi officials tried at Nuremburg were charged with "crimes against
humanity." Id. The Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals also have jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity. Scheffer, supranote 2, at 34, 40.
74.
Weston, supranote 20, at 25.
75.
Id. Cf. Douglas L. Donoho, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417
(1991) (reviewing ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,
UNIVERSALISM VERsUS RELATIVISM (1990)) ("Renteln challenges what she describes

as a presumption of universality in current human rights thinking by
demonstrating the western origins of many rights set forth in the Universal
Declaration. . . . The most important aspect of Renteln's discussion here is
her... observation that it is shortsighted and perhaps ethnocentric simply to
presume the universality of current international norms, given the array of
divergent perspectives on international human rights.").
76.
Weston, supranote 20, at 25.
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rights were added, including "the right of all peoples to selfdetermination and the right of ethnic, religious, or linguistic
minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
78
own religion, and to use their own language."

The Universal Declaration is generally recognized as the
authoritative articulation and enumeration of the essential
human rights of individuals. Since the Universal Declaration and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
rights of people to self-determination and to "economic selfdetermination" have been formulated by the international
79
community and standardized in conventions and covenants.
Over the last fifty years, there have also been suggestions of an
additional "generation" of rights including the elimination of
8
racial discrimination,8 0 elimination of religious discrimination, '
82
elimination of discrimination against women,
and other
conventions and protocols greatly expanding the concept of
"human rights." 83
B. CulturalRelativism

Expansion of human rights has met with resistance as
governments often point to local or regional cultural traditions as
a valid basis for not enforcing or complying with various treaties
and protocols. 84 Cultural relativism is an offshoot of modem
moral philosophy which emphasizes the concept that different
states have either different conceptions of right and wrong8 5 or

77.

Civil Law and Political Covenant. supra note 13.

Most of the rights

explicated in the Universal Declaration were Incorporated Into the Civil and
Political Covenant, which is also used to understand the Universal Declaration
more fully. Weston, supranote 20, at 25.
78.
Civil Law and Political Covenant. supranote 13, art. 2(1).
79.
See, e.g., Economic and Social Covenant, supra note 17; European
Convention. supranote 13; American Convention. supranote 17; African Charter.
supranote 13.
80.
See. e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1996, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
81.
See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
DiscriminationBased on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc.A/RES/36/55 (1981).
82.
See Convention on the Eliminationof All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N.
Doc. No. A/34/180 (1979).
83.
See, e.g., Convention on the Rghts of the Child. G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49,at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989).
84.
Fernando R. Tes6n, InternationalHuman Rghts and CulturalRelativism,
25 VA. J. INTL L. 869, 869-70 (1985).
85.
Id. at 870-71. Many non-Western states have complained that the
rights in the major human rights conventions and protocols emphasize Western
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subscribe to "metaethical philosophy" which denies the
possibility of discovering or articulating an absolute moral
truth.8 6 Cultural relativism can be defined "as the position
according to which local cultural traditions (including religious,
political, and legal practices) properly determine the existence of
civil and political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given
society."87 Local communities practice unique customs and value
ideals specific to the community.
Many contemporary situations exemplify the tension between
domestic cultural imperatives and international norms:
for
example, mutilation and flogging as criminal punishment, the
circumcision of women; the subjugation of women, and various
authoritarian methods of government are all topics upon which
international law and local custom diverge.
All of these
contemporary practices, while clearly unlawful by international
standards, are defended by some as being required or permitted
8
by cultural traditions.

8

Cultural relativists

argue that sovereignty and

self-

determination require the international community to practice
tolerance and reject notions of normative standards. 8 9 Since no
central, institutionalized organs adjudicate and enforce "world"

opinions on human rights, there can be no common, singular
basis of interpretation and understanding of subjective concepts

rights and demonstrate a bias towards Western political philosophy.

Higgins,

supra note 19. at 93.
Generally speaking... cultural relativists are committed to one or
both of the following premises: that knowledge and truth are culturally
contingent, creating a barrier to cross-cultural understanding: and that all
cultures are equally valid. Combined with the empirical observation of
cultural diversity worldwide, these two premises lead to the conclusion
that human rights norms do not transcend cultural location and cannot be
readily translated across cultures.
Id. at 95.
86.
See. e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZScHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 9-12 (1888)
(Walter Kaufmann trans.. Vintage Books 1996). "There are no moral phenomena
at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena." Id. at 85.
87.
Tes6n, supra note 84, at 870. Cf. Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4
(1978). The European Court of Human Rights rejected the notion that the Isle of
Man could Inflict corporal punishment as a "local requirement" exception to
Article 63(3) of the European Convention. Id. at 18.
88.
Tes6n, supra note 84, at 870-71 n.10.
Cf
Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 82, art. 2

("States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms."); see also
Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535
(1985).
89.
Tes6n, supranote 84, at 870-71 n. 10.
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such as "human rights." 9 0 Furthermore, the primary principles
governing the relations of states-sovereignty and selfdetermination-preclude the international community from
interfering with the governance choices of local populations. 9 1

Taken to the extreme, the theory contends that people have the
right to create whatever type of government they choose, no
matter how repressive, and protests by other nations should have
92
no bearing on the internal preferences of the state.
Proponents of cultural relativism argue that the absence of
absolute norms in the interpretation of human rights presents a
legal defense to any claims made against the state based on an
interpretation of a convention or treaty. 93 Thus, governments

may regulate their citizens in a manner that greatly varies from

the core meanings of international human rights law by altering
any human rights codes to conform to local cultural traditions.
Cultural relativism has been primarily advocated by nonWestem countries. 9 4
These states argue what British
philosopher Karl Popper maligned as "the conspiracy theory of
human rights." 95
Popper denigrates non-Western nations'
commitment to human rights by asserting that these nations
claim that:
[H]uman rights are a Machiavellian creation of the West calculated
to impair the economic development of the Third World. Starting
from the Marxist assumption that civil and political rights are
"formal" bourgeois freedoms that serve only the interests of the
capitalists, the conspiracy theory holds that human rights serve the
same purpose in the international arena.
It sees them as
instruments of domination because they are indissolubly tied to the
right of property, and because in the field of international economic
relations, the human rights movement fosters free and unrestricted
trade, which seriously hurts the economies of Third World
nations[.) . . [In their viewj human rights advocacy amounts to
moral imperialism. In short, the effect, if not the design of such an
exclusive political preoccupation Is to leave the door open to the

90.
See J. S. Watson. Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development
of Human Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L. REv. 609, 609-15
(1979).
91.
Tes6n, supra note 84, at 880-881. See also Declarationon the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR,
15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doe. A/4684 (1960) ("All peoples have the
right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.").
92.
Tes6n, supranote 84, at 881-83.
93.
Id. at 877. See also supranote 87.
94.
Tes6n, supranote 84, at 871. See also supranote 17.
95.
KARL POPPER, 2 THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 94 (5th ed. 1966).
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most ruthless and predatory economic forces in international
society. 9 6

Cultural relativism is a powerful argument for the non-uniformity
of application of human rights law. Western nations contend that
the use of the argument is an excuse for nations to avoid
conforming with their international obligations. 97 Non-Western
nations respond that the emphasis on human rights is a
mechanism by which Western nations exploit less developed
countries and is simply another form of Western imperialism. 9 8
The ultimate effect of cultural relativism is to limit the number of
human rights that truly have a universal application.
C. HumanRights Regimes in Liberal. Socialist,and Third World
Regimes

Related to the concept of cultural relativism is the theory that
different political and social regimes value certain human rights
over others. 99 Though somewhat facile, this framework is best
analyzed from the three main political ideologies dominant in the
modem world: the neoliberal regimes of the West, which
emphasize individual and economic freedom; socialist states
which accentuate social harmony and unity: and the loosely
grouped nations of the Third World, which place importance on
group identity. 100
Western notions of human rights are derived from an
individualistically oriented philosophy premised on economic
rights.' 0 1 As articulated by Hobbes and Locke, the liberal,
capitalistic society is a formation of groups of individuals
contracting together to form a nation. According to this contract,
individuals relinquish some rights to protect other, more
important rights. 102 However, some rights are "inalienable" and
can never be disavowed or contracted away.' 0 3 Critics of the
Western tradition argue that:

96.

Id.

Tes6n. supranote 84. at 896.
Id. at 896-97.
Adamantia Pollis, Human Rights in Liberal, Socialist, and Third World
Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD CoMMuNrnY: ISSUES AND ACnON 146
97.
98.
99.

(Richard Pierre Claude &Burns H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992).

100.

Id. at 146-52. The first generation of rights embodies Western ideals

and influenced the development of the Universal Declaration and Civil and
Political Covenant. See, supra note 13. The African Charter includes the idea of
the rights of "peoples." See African Charter, supranote 13, art. 19-24.
101.
Pollis, supranote 99, at 146-48.
102. THoMAS HOBBES. LEVIATHmN 189-201 (Penguin Books 1984) (165); JOHN
LocKE, TWo TREATIES OF GOvERNMENT 122-28 (Hafner 1947) (1690).
103.
Id.
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Political power... was to be attained and maintained through a
representative political system grounded in the exercise of
individual civil and political rights . . . [Traditional communal

bonds, albeit hierarchically structured, were severed and replaced
by atomized individuals ...
[Tihe exercise of inalienable civil and
political rights among the property-less, including the individual
freedom of choice that is central to the exercise of rights, often were
inoperative. But the disparity of economic and political power
between those who owned the means of production and those who
did not and the inequalities between parties to a contract were
developments that were Ignored by the modem political
10 4
philosophers and the classical economists.

For Socialist thinkers, this inequality of bargaining power
between individuals made the whole regime illegitimate. 105 Marx
found the Hobbesian notion of the "state of nature" 0 6 troubling
and argued instead that communities that antedated modem
states lived in a form of primitive communism. 107 Socialist states
contend that the civil and political rights defended by the
neoliberal, capitalist states are "bourgeois" 0 8 rights that result
from the dominance of capitalism in the formulation of human
rights conventions. These rights serve only the capitalists and not
the laborers-there is nothing fundamental about the "rights"
promulgated by this system. 109
These regimes believe that the only fundamental rights of
people are the "material conditions of existence," such as food,
clothing, and work.1 0
The socioeconomic struggles of
individuals, defined within the framework of "class struggle," Is

104. Pollis, supranote 99, at 147.
105. Friedrich Engels, Excerptfrom The Origin of the Family, PrivateProperty
and the State. in KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS: BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS &
PHILOSoPHY 392-94 (Lewis S. Feuer ed., 1959) (1884). Marxist thought Is
predicated on class struggles. KARL MARX & FRIEDEICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY 12 (International 1983) (1848) [hereinafter THE COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO]. Because the bourgeoisie control the means of production, they have
the means to create a world in their image. Id. at 19.
106. See Hobbes, supranote 102, at 189-201.
107. Polls, supra note 99, at 149.
"It was a communal existence
characterized by equality among all, an existence in which land, animals, and
tools were shared. The accumulation of individual wealth, private property,
individual ownership of the means of production, and class differences-all these
were later stages in historical development, as were individual rights." Id.
108. "From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of
the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie
were developed." THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, supra note 105, at 13.
109. Pollis, supra note 99, at 150. The only rights that exIst are legally
premised ones granted by the state to fulfill obligations to the state. Id.
110. I. See generally Karl Marx, Excerptsfrom CapitaLk A Critique of Political
Economy, in KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS: BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS &

PHILOSOPHY

133-67 (Lewis S. Feuer ed., 1959); Friedrich Engels, Soclalsrm

Utopian and Sctentfic, in KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS: BASIC WRITINGS ON
POLITCS & PHILOSOPHY 68-111 (Lewis S. Feuer ed., 1959).
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One's ability to achieve self-fulfillment is

defined within the context of one's place in the greater society:"'t
the rights of individuals are defined in relation to each other by
the general concept of communistic societies of production
2
according to ability and distribution based on need. 1
Marx argued that the ideal society envisioned by

Communists would be devoid of the tensions inherent in societies
with different socioeconomic classes." 3 He claimed that in a
Communist state, "harmony reigns and the capitalist-generated
antagonisms between the individual and society disappear.
Individual freedom-that is, the full exercise of capabilities and
the fulfillment of needs-is contingent on a unity and harmony
1 14
among society's members, and between them and nature."
Thus the purpose of the state is to provide the basic economic
and social needs of the individual. It is the provision of these
115
needs that constitute the basis of Socialist human rights.
The regimes loosely referred to as Third World states,1 1 6 or
less developed countries, generally "view their personhood in
terms of their group identity." 1 17 People in this amalgamation of
states are more likely to define their individual identity within the
context of the group. 118 Of course, different regions have unique
traditions and differing social patterns, but states in this group
generally view "inherent individual rights, rooted in notions of
'freedom of (civil or political rights) or 'freedom from' (economic,
social or cultural rights) [as] meaningless concepts."1 19
The common experience of the less developed group of
nations was one of colonialism, the subjugation of the national

111.
Socialist states accept the principles of civil and political rights, but
only as secondary to economic and social rights. Western states have generally

placed a secondary importance to social and economic rights after civil and
political rights. Pollis, supra note 99, at 150.

112.

See THE COMMUNIS MANIFESTO, supranote 105, at 51-53.

113. Marx contended that after the proletariat organized itself and became
the ruling class, sweeping away "the old conditions." the class antagonisms
inherent in the old structures would cease to exist. Id. at 53.

114.

Pollis. supranote 99, at 149.

115. Id.at 150.
116.
"The expression Third World,' inclusive of such diverse areas as Africa,
Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, is descriptive of their common economic
underdevelopment, their dependence on the Western industrialized states and
formerly the Soviet Union, and their struggle to attain nationhood and economic
modernization.... [The] term obscures the significant differences that are to be
found among the countries in question." Id. at 152.
117.
Id. This communitarian instinct Is most notable in Articles 19-24 of
the African Charter which recognize the rights of "peoples." African Charter,
supranote 13, at 62-63.
118.
See E. J. M. Zvobgo, A Third World View, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 90-106 (Donald P. Kommers & Gilburt D. Loescher eds., 1979).
119.
Polls, supranote 99, at 152.
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will by a foreign power. 120 These nations were subject to
economic exploitation, repression of the populace and local
customs, and strict political rule which had less value for the
native population than the colonial rulers. 12 1 The colonialists did
not transmit ideas to the colonies such as individual respect, nor
did they entertain for the natives values such as liberty or
freedom.' 2 2 Thus the modem Western emphasis on individual
human rights, in particular the civil and political rights, has not
been given much credence.' 2 3 These views are reflected in the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 124 The African
Charter contains fewer restrictions on the use (and abuse) of
rights
human
power than
most international
state
instruments. 125 In addition, though a number of individual
1 27
6
rights are listed, 1 2 the rights of "peoples" are also listed.

In conclusion, the importance of distinct human rights has
context within the greater political regime. Western states favor
the civil and political rights, socialist states favor economic and
social rights, and Third World regimes favor group rights. Any
application of human rights on, a universal basis must take Into
account the differences between states' interpretations of these
rights.
D. Synthesizing the Framework

Starting with the expansive notions of rights articulated In
the Universal Declaration, 128 the human rights that can be
protected on a systematic level must take into account theories of
cultural relativism 129 and the various political regimes 130 that
exist in the international community. What is quickly apparent Is
that there is only a small number of truly universal ideals-those
which all societies share, despite varying cultural or political
beliefs.

120.
121.

Id. at 153.
Id.

122.

Id.

123.
Id. See also supra part II.B (describing the concept of the conspiracy
theory of human rights). This idea argues that human rights are promulgated by
Western nations to maintain a moral imperialism and an economic system
balanced in their favor.
124.
African Charter, supranote 13. No such regional human rights charter
exists in Asia or the Middle East.
Polls, supranote 99, at 153.
125.
126.
African Charter, supranote 13, arts. 2-17.
Id. arts. 19-22.
127.
128.
Supra note 13.
129.
See supraPart II.B.
130.
See supraPart II.C.
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The primary human right that can be protected in all
situations by the international community is the right to life.
Articulated in all human rights treatises.13 1 all societies and
regimes agree that the most fundamental right is the right of
existence. An extension of this concept produces the conclusion
that genocide is an extreme violation of human rights.
More difficult to validate are anti-torture and anti-rape
rights. 132 If the right of the individual is simply an extension of
the group, the group can abuse one of its own based on relative
cultural norms. 13 3 In addition, the question of what exactly is
torture is problematic in all societies including the liberal
Western regimes.' 3 4 However, all groups and societies pay
homage to this norm, 13 5 in part because excessive corporal
13 6
punishment can easily lead to the loss of life.
Another universally articulated norm is the prohibition
against slavery. 13 7
Similar to the problem of anti-torture
provisions, this norm has interpretation problems.
Socialist
countries would argue that the plight of many urban laborers in
the West is slavery. 13 8 Again, though there may be interpretative
difficulties, the international community as a whole accepts that

131.

See, e.g,, UniversalDeclaration,supranote 13, art. 3 ("everyone has the

right to life"); African Charter, supranote 13, art. 4 ("Human beings are Inviolable.
Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his
person.").
132. The following discussion will assume that rape is a form of torture and
subsumed within the concept of torture.
The U.N. Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda have decided that mass rape is
a form of genocide. See U.S. Announces Grant for Mass-Rape Trials, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12156051. Eight Bosnian
Serbs were indicted for organized mass rape by the tribunal on June 27, 1996. 8
Serbs, 9 Croats Indicted: War Crimes PanelAlso Seeks Karadzic'sArrest. CHI. TRIB.,
June 28. 1996, at 12. These mass rapes allegedly took place on orders from
Bosnian Serb leaders. Mass Rape in Bosnia Took Place on Orders From Above.
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, July 2. 1996 available in LEXIS, World Library, DPA
File. Men were also sexually abused. Id.
133. Pollis, supra note 99, at 153.
134. The European Court of Human Rights found, in Ireland v. United
Kingdorn, supra note 25, that the use of military police and the interrogation
techniques of hooding, wall-standing, subjection to noise, deprivation of food,
sleep, and drink, did not constitute torture.
135. Zvobogo, supra note 118. at 100-03.
136. Id.
137. See UniversalDeclaration,supra note 13. at 73, art. 4 ("No one shall be
held in slavery or servitude[.J"); African Charter, supranote 13, art. 5 ("All forms of
exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade ... shall be
prohibited").
138. THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, supranote 105, at 23.
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this is a norm of the human race and transgressions should be
punished. 139
These are the only universally agreed upon norms that can
be protected through international mechanisms. Other values
and rights that may be agreed upon universally-for example. the
right to freedom of religion-cannot be enforced by the
international community because of pragmatic considerations. It
would be difficult to prove such violations and they would be even
0
harder to redress. 14

IV. A DEsCRPTIVE THEORY INCORPORATING NORMATIVE VALUES
The only human rights that the international community can
prosecute as a whole are violations of the right to life, genocide.
torture, and slavery. The international community needs to
enforce these ideals whenever violations occur because these are
the principal rights of all people throughout the world, regardless
of the cultural or political regime to which they belong. These are
the rights that all people agree are the most important for each
individual human being devoid of whether one's sense of being is
defined as an individual or through a group.
The international community needs to enforce these rights
because only by criminal punishment will human rights abusers

be effectively punished for past actions and deterred from future
repression.141 For the deterrence factor to be effective, 142 the
violator must believe and respect that the law is not merely words
on paper, but an obligation, that if not met, will result in
Furthermore, intervention and
sanctions or penalties. 143
prosecution are effective devices in aiding nations and societies in
the transition from an authoritarian or despotic regime to 144a
democratic one valuing the rights of each individual.
Prosecutions may be a necessary step towards the creation of a
democratic state-because by demonstrating that no one is above
139.
For example. though Article 4(1) of the Civil Law and Political Covenant
permits a suspension or breach of the Covenant in times of public emergency. no
derogation is permitted from Article 8(1) which prohibits slavery. Civil Law and
Political Covenant, supranote 13.
140. This does not mean that other violations should not be prosecuted. It

only means that the international community cannot institute tribunals and
prosecute violators as was done at Nuremburg. Enforcement would need to be
done by the people themselves, a subsequent regime or at a regional level, where
neighboring nations would share beliefs and Ideologies.
141. Transitionto Democracy, supra note 42, at 1056.
142. Effective being defined in this Note as stopping future human rights
violations.
143. See generally D'Amato, supra note 8, at 503-05.
144. Malamud-Goti, supranote 30, at 89.
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the law, legitimacy is accorded to the institutions of the state
providing the people with a belief in the functioning of the
145
state.
However, this normative ideal is strictly confined by the
primary directive or ordering that exists in the modem world:
state sovereignty and self-determination. 146
All regimes
throughout the world-Western liberal democracies, socialist
nations (or nations in transition from socialism), and less
developed nations-value sovereignty as one of the most

important ideals of the international community. 147 States will
not enforce "minimal" transgressions of the international law of
14 8
human rights for fear that they too will be held accountable.
States often decry the actions of other states, but will not take
149
organized action against a rogue regime.
Thus, it is possible to say that the international community
should investigate and prosecute all violations of the universal
rights of life, anti-torture and anti-slavery. Ideally, someday, the
world community will be able to appropriately deal with every
transgressor.15 0
This normative ideal must be refined to
accurately describe how the world community actually deals with
human rights violations: a descriptive theory premised on
normative values. Such a theory must be premised on the tools
that the policymaker uses in making decisions in the
international arena: utility principles and realpolitik.15 1
A. UtilitarianPrinciples
Utilitarianism, in its broadest definition "comprises all
consequence theories of ethics, premised on the principle that the
rightness or moral worth of any action depends on the overall

145.
Orentlicher, supranote 23, at 2543.
146.
KUPER, supra note 45, at 161.
147.
Falk, supranote 44, at 33.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150. This could only be done with a judicial system that has enforcement
capabilities. Tom J. Farer, The United Nations and Human Rights: More Than a
Whimper, Less Than a Roar, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD CoMMUNTY: ISSUES AND
AcTIONs 229, 230-31 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 1992).
151.
Both utilitarianism and realpolitik are organizational philosophies

offering explanations for the results of actions. JOHN STUART MILLS, UTILITARIANISM
ii (10th ed. 1888); HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, PoLITIcs AMONG
NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 3 (1985) [hereinafter POLTCS AMONG
NATIONSI. A descriptive framework is an attempt to explain the world as it is, not
necessarily as it should be. The focus of the descriptive framework is also on
consequences, readily permitting the application of consequence theories.

Realpolitik is also referred to as political realism. It "aims at the realization of
the lesser evil than of the absolute good." POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, supraat 4.
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goodness of its consequences." 152
The primary principle of
utilitarianism states that "the greatest happiness of all those
whose interest is in question, as being the right and proper, and
only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human
action." 15 3 John Mills further refined the definition to that "creed
which accepts as the foundation of morals utility, or the greatest
happiness principle . . . that actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
the reverse of happiness." 5 4 The principle of utility focuses on
welfare "secured to all mankind."155 The duty of the politician is
to promulgate only those laws that are necessary to deter the
greatest number of individuals from acting detrimentally to the

general welfare.' 5 6 Utilitarianism is focused on results, implying

that "motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action." 5 7
There is no nobility to self-sacrifice unless it leads to
consequences that maximize utility.' 5 8
Thus, utilitarianism
ultimately assumes: "(1) that the ends or values of policies can be
compared by a common measure of expected utility (also called
happiness, satisfaction, or welfare) and (2) that the best policy or
set of policies is that which maximizes the total expected
159

utility."

Principles of utility are formulated on a strict cost-benefit
analysis.16 0
Critics of utilitarianism argue that cost-benefit
analysis is either inappropriate or unable to make the moral
choices involved in the loss of life or the torturing of innocent
persons.'16
However, the underlying principles of utilitarianism
are attractive to the policymaker because they offer a relatively

152.

Utilitarianism Is teleological in analysis, focusing on ends and not the

means. MILLS, supranote 151. at ff.
153.
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 1 (1907).

154. MILLS, supranote 151, at 3 (emphasis in original).
155.
Id. at 4.
156.
BENTHAM, supra note 153, at iI. Based on this concept, human rights
enforcement policies should be premised on maximizing the number of lives that
can be saved. In some cases, this may require the use of truth commissions or
granting general amnesty.

157.

Id.

158.

Id

159.
Policy Analysis: Introduction, in ETHICS & POLITICS: CASES AND COMMENTS
139 (Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson eds., 1990). The various forms of policy
analysis include cost-benefit, cost-effective, and risk-benefit analysis. Id. at 139,
The moral foundation of these concepts Is utilitarianism. Id.
160. Id. at xiv. "Politicians must employ only those means that maximize
benefits to all people who are affected by their use." Id. Since human rights
enforcement is an attempt to maximize benefits to the world, this limits the means
available to the policymaker.
161.
Id. at xiv.
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easy guide for hard choices: the maximizing of the public good. 162
Furthermore, as utilitarians note, there is no better principle
than cost-benefit analysis by which public officials can make the
policy choices among competing ideas. 163
B. Realpoilik
Realpolitik, also called political realism, 164 asserts that the
defining concept in the "landscape of international politics is the
concept of interest defined in terms of power." 1 65 States attempt

to maximize their power, 166 and the strong wield the maximum
power. 167 The political realist "aware of the moral significance of
political action ... is also aware of... successful political action.
[The political realist] is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that
tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political
issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics
were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the
68
moral law less exacting than it actually is."'
Power is wielded at the international level by nation-states
depending on a number of different factors including geography,
natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness,
population, national character, and national morale.' 69 Those
nation-states such as the United States, the former Soviet Union,
and the People's Republic of China, which are endowed with more
of these factors than other states, can be labelled as "world
powers." 170 Two primary points can be derived from realpolitlc.1)
a nation's policies do not necessarily reflect conventional notions
of "morality," but instead may be advocated to enhance a nation's

162.

Id. Furthermore, as the discussion on cultural relativism indicated, it

is difficult to find norms that are applicable across all cultures. See infra part
II.B. In a world of cultural moralism, even if the policymaker wanted to make
moral choices, the policymaker may not be able to because there is no single

moral option.
163. Id.
164.
PoLrncs AMONG NATIONS, supranote 15 1, at 5.
165.
Id.
166.
Id. at 31.
167.
Id. at 5. Since interest is defined in terms of power, a nation wields its
power to maximize its interests.
168.
Id. at 12.
169.
Id. at 127-53. Morgenthau and Thompson categorize these factors as
either "stable" or "subject to change." Id. at 127. They contend that geography,
natural resources. industrial capacity, and military preparedness are more stable
than the other categories. Id. at 128-153. "The relative influence of the different
factors upon national power must be determined with regard to all nations that
compete with each other in the field of international politics." Id. at 171-72.
170.
See generally id. at 127-53.
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power; and 2) to paraphrase George Orwell. some states are more
equal than other states. 171
C. Synthesis
First, the principles that can be drawn from utilitarianism

are that the greatest good must be maximized. ]72 and a costbenefit analysis must be performed to discover the best policy to
be taken. 17 3 The maximization of social utility includes the good
of fiture generations.1 74 Second, the principles that can be drawn
from realpolitik are that moral choices are not necessarily
consistent with conventional mores, 175 and when decisions are
being formulated, some states are stronger and more important
than others in the international community. 176
In applying the universal normative values of human rightsthat the goal of the international community is to protect lives
and prohibit torture and slavery-to these principles, one can
derive a descriptive theory of normative values. To maximize
these values, not only for the present population of the world, but
for future generations, the international community must perform
a cost-benefit analysis as to when and where tribunals can be
used.
First, such a cost-benefit analysis must take into account the
scope of the atrocities. For example, in a domestic parallel, the
U.S. federal government does not prosecute jay-walkers, but a
local municipality might. Though every act of torture or unlawful
killing is contrary to the concept of human rights, the world
cannot step in and react, but must leave such disciplinary
actions to the sovereign state. It would be neither cost-effective
nor efficient for an international tribunal to try every such case.
Thus, the international community can only enact tribunals when
atrocities occur on a wide scale such as genocide, mass torture or
rape, or systematic slavery.
Second, any such analysis must take into account the power
of the state, its condition, or both. It is important to note that the
only tribunals that have been organized by the international
community have been Nuremburg, when the German state

ceased to exist and was being run by Great Britain, France,
171. See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946).
Orwell's famous
statement posits that "some animals are more equal than others[.j." Id. Similarly,
though all entities in the international system are sovereign "nations," all
"nations" are not equal.
172. MILLS, supranote 151, at 3.
173. Policy Analysis, supranote 159, at 139.
174. See generally icl at xli-xlv.
175. POLrncs AMONG NATIONS, supranote 151. at 12.
176. I. at 127-53.
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United States, and the former Soviet Union

177

377

Bosnia, where a

horrendous civil war destroyed all aspects of the nation-state: 17 8
and Rvanda, a country that teetered on the edge of complete self179
destruction.
There is also the greater problem of state sovereignty. No
state is willing to sanction, at the present time, the use of
tribunals against another state if such a mechanism could then
be used against it. Tribunals will only be effective, and will only
be permitted, when the offending state has ceased to exist or
when the offending nation is such an international pariah that
any arguments used to implement action against a rogue state
can be distinguished.
The principles set forth in this Note are implicated in the
creation of the Tribunals in Rwanda and Bosnia. First, these
nation-states had effectively ceased to exist when the Tribunals
were created.18 0 negating concerns about sovereignty. Secondly.
both Tribunals were created to respond to the charges of genocide
and mass torture and rape.' 8 ' These are not commonplace
charges of human rights abuses but are the most important
concepts protected by human rights instruments. 8 2 Finally,
from a realpolitik perspective, neither Bosnia nor Rwanda are
superpowers. Neither country was, or is going to be in the near

future, a country able to wield a great deal of power in
international politics.
Critics will immediately question the utility of this
framework. They will argue that only the weak or destroyed will
be affected and that there will be no change in the
implementation of international human rights. There are two
responses. First, if this framework is implemented today, all
states will know that there is a baseline that the international
community will never fall below. The development of effective
enforcement procedures is not precluded, but assured. As the
nations of the world realize that the present system is ineffective,
change will only strengthen the baseline structure. In addition, it
presents a clear and convincing commitment on the part of the
nations of the world that action will be taken in specific
situations, adding to the overall deterrence of the system.
177. See INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 879 (1993) (Louis Henkin
et al. eds., 3rd ed. 1993).
178. Even so. peacekeepers have been reluctant to arrest human rights
violators for fear of reprisal. Elizabeth Neuffer, Elusive Justice it Will Take an
InternationalCourt to Deter War Criminals,BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1996, at D 1.
179. See Christopher J. Dodd. Needed. a Permanent War-Crimes Thbunal,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONIrOR, Dec. 16. 1996, at 19.
180.
See Neuffer, supranote 178. at D1; Dodd, supranote 179, at 19.
181.
Cohen, supra note 2, at A2; Neuffer, supranote 3, at Al.
182.
See supraPart III.
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Second, this system in no way precludes individual nations from
taking further action against violators including economic and
diplomatic sanctions or any other technique used to coerce other
states. It also does not preclude any action taken by regional
courts and organizations. Again, it simply creates a clear, brightline standard by which all future violations can be judged.
V. CONCLUSION

The present state of human rights enforcement is unclear.
Though the Bosnian and War Crimes Tribunal could be a step in
the right direction towards effectively implementing human rights
treaties and conventions, they may be ineffective or nothing more
than anomalies. The international community must implement a
bright-line baseline standard for the whole world as to when
tribunals will be established. Such a standard must take into
account the realities of world politics as well as questions of cost
and efficiency. Additionally, only some human rights values
qualify as truly universal. The enforcement of human rights that
may not be universal should not be inflicted upon weaker
societies and nations. The only normative human rights values,
at the present time, are the right to life, and freedom from torture
and slavery.
These values should be protected by the
international community whenever abused by rogue nations or
when the internal structure of a nation has collapsed. This
framework does not preclude action by individual states or
regional compacts.
GautamRana"
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